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ASSESSING THE VIABILITY OF IMPLICIT BIAS EVIDENCE IN 




The theory of implicit bias occupies a rapidly growing field of 
scientific research and legal scholarship. With the advent of tools 
measuring individuals’ subconscious biases toward people of other races, 
genders, ages, national origins, religions, and sexual orientations, 
scholars have rushed to explore the ways in which these biases might 
affect decision-making and produce broad societal consequences. 
The question that remains unanswered for scholars, attorneys, and 
judges is whether evidence of implicit bias and its effects can or should 
be used in legal proceedings. Although the study of implicit bias dates 
back several decades, only recently have judicial opinions begun to make 
direct reference to this body of research.
The focus of this Comment is five federal cases that each discussed 
implicit bias extensively and together represent the most developed legal 
precedent on the admissibility of implicit bias evidence. Although a small 
number of other cases also feature extensive discussions of implicit bias, 
these five cases provide a unique basis for comparison because they are 
factually and procedurally very similar. All five cases were employment 
discrimination actions brought under federal law. In four of the five cases, 
the plaintiffs sought to introduce the testimony of the same expert witness 
on implicit bias. Therefore, the courts in these cases applied similar 
substantive and procedural standards to both the plaintiffs’ prima facie 
cases and to their expert’s proffered testimony. Three of the courts sided 
with the plaintiffs and treated implicit bias evidence favorably; the other 
two courts rejected evidence of implicit bias.
Because there are only these five cases, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions from them with certainty. Nevertheless, this Comment 
considers ways in which implicit bias evidence could be presented to 
increase the likelihood it will be admitted and to minimize conflict with 
the unfavorable precedent. It also looks at strategies for admitting implicit 
bias evidence that have not yet been attempted but are potentially 
promising.
                                                                                                                     
* J.D. 2016, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom LLP, Washington, D.C. I would like to thank Professor Jason P. Nance for 
introducing me to this important topic and for his valuable contributions to this Comment. Thank 
you also to the Florida Law Review staff for their hard work editing.
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INTRODUCTION
The theory of implicit bias occupies a rapidly growing field of 
scientific research and legal scholarship. With the advent of tools 
measuring individuals’ subconscious biases toward people of other races, 
genders, ages, national origins, religions, and sexual orientations, 
scholars have rushed to explore the ways in which these biases might 
affect decision-making and produce broad societal consequences.1 An
overwhelming majority of social scientists and legal commentators in the 
field agree that implicit bias exists and has behavioral consequences that 
adversely affect minority and less-favored groups in American society.2
This recognition of implicit bias as a problem has prompted scholars 
to devise ways that it might be addressed. Prominent legal commentators 
have long argued that implicit bias evidence should be admissible in 
employment discrimination cases.3 In the wake of several high-profile 
police shootings of black males, many authors have also begun to argue 
that implicit bias should be acknowledged by law enforcement officials 
in the management of their departments and potentially offered as 
evidence in cases against officers.4 More recent scholarship has expanded 
the possible applications of implicit bias research to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and school disciplinary methods.5
The question that remains unanswered for scholars, attorneys, and 
judges is whether evidence of implicit bias and its effects can or should 
be used in legal proceedings. Although the study of implicit bias dates 
back several decades, only recently have judicial opinions begun to make 
direct reference to this body of research. In most cases where the implicit 
bias theory has been mentioned, courts have cited or introduced it by their 
own initiative—in other words, the parties in those cases did not mention 
implicit bias in their pleadings or seek to introduce evidence related to 
implicit bias.6 However, in the past six years, implicit bias evidence has 
been offered in a handful of cases, and judges in those cases have directly 
confronted the question of whether that evidence is valuable and 
admissible.
The focus of this Comment is five federal cases that each discussed 
implicit bias extensively and together represent the most developed legal 
                                                                                                                     
1. See infra notes 9, 27–29 and accompanying text.
2. But see Gregory Mitchell & Phillip A. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils 
of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006) (arguing the research on implicit bias is not 
persuasive enough to be accepted as legislative authority); Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating 
Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV. 979 (2008) (arguing there are other explanations for 
what some say is unconscious bias).
3. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 27.
5. See infra note 28.
6. See infra note 7.
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precedent on the admissibility of implicit bias evidence. Although a small 
number of other cases also feature discussions of implicit bias, these five 
cases provide a unique basis for comparison because they are factually 
and procedurally very similar. All five cases were employment 
discrimination actions brought under federal law. In four of the five cases, 
the plaintiffs sought to introduce the testimony of an expert witness on 
implicit bias. Therefore, the courts in these cases applied similar 
substantive and procedural standards. Three of the courts sided with the 
plaintiffs and treated implicit bias evidence favorably; the other two 
courts rejected evidence of implicit bias. Implicit bias has also been 
discussed or cited in non-discrimination cases.7 Additionally, there are a 
handful of state discrimination cases,8 but those courts considered the 
issue far less extensively than the federal cases discussed in this 
Comment and have thus been excluded.
Part I of this Comment provides a general overview of implicit bias 
theory and the legal debate that has developed around it. Part II discusses 
the legal standards that were important in the five federal cases that are 
the focus of this Comment. Part III analyzes those cases, highlighting 
similarities and points of divergence. Part IV draws limited conclusions 
from these cases about the future of implicit bias evidence in federal 
discrimination actions.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE THEORY OF IMPLICIT BIAS
Implicit bias theory is a product of the study of implicit social 
cognition. Implicit social cognition science examines psychological 
phenomena in which individuals harbor unconscious associations 
between identity characteristics—such as race, gender, and age—and 
social meanings or values.9 Implicit bias theory describes how these 
                                                                                                                     
7. E.g., United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2015) (considering a defendant’s 
objection to the word “felon” being used by prosecutors describing his charges); Farrakhan v. 
Gregoire, No. CV-96-076-RHW, 2006 WL 1889273, at *1, *5 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006), rev’d 
on other grounds, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2010) (en banc) (considering whether felon 
disenfranchisement laws denied the right to vote to racial minorities); Supplemental Permanent 
Injunction/Judgment Order, Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-02513-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 
5498218, at *14–15 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 
Apr. 15, 2015) (granting injunctive relief to plaintiffs who sued a sheriff’s department for using 
race as a factor in assessing whether a reasonable suspicion existed for investigating or detaining 
Latinos in motor vehicles in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
8. E.g., Pippen v. State, 854 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2014).
9. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186–
87 (1995).
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associations form attitudes and stereotypes about categories of people 
possessing particular identity characteristics.10
The primary tool for measuring implicit bias is the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT), which was created by Dr. Anthony Greenwald.11
The IAT is a computerized test in which participants are asked to sort 
pictures by identifying characteristics—such as black faces and white 
faces—by pressing different keys.12 Participants are then asked to sort 
positive and negative words, such as trustworthy and violent, 
respectively.13 Finally, participants must pair the words with the 
identifying characteristics according to different prompts.14 For example, 
in the Race IAT, participants are first asked to pair positive words like 
“smart” with white faces; in the next exercise, they are asked to pair those 
positive words with black faces.15 The computer measures the time 
required to complete these pairings and user errors.16 Pairings that take 
longer and produce more errors indicate greater levels of bias. For 
example, participants who take longer to pair black faces with positive 
words are to an extent biased against African-Americans.17
Hundreds of thousands of individuals have taken different forms of 
the IAT.18 The results of the Race IAT show an overwhelming preference 
for whites, even among black study participants.19 Studies have also 
revealed biases against Latinos, Jews, Asians, non-Americans, women, 
gays, and the elderly.20 Additionally, the IAT is predictive of bias among 
individuals that purport to have progressive or egalitarian beliefs.21
                                                                                                                     
10. See Krieger, supra note 9, at 1187; Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1489, 1507–08 (2005).
11. MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF 
GOOD PEOPLE ch. 3 (2013); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: 
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 952 n.23 (2006).
12. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 11, at 952.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Kang, supra note 10, at 1508–09.
16. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 11, at 952; see also BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra 
note 11, at 42.
17. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1199 (2009).
18. See Implicit Association Test, BLINDSPOT, http://blindspot.fas.harvard.edu/IAT (last 
visited June 30, 2017).
19. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 11, at 47.
20. See, e.g., Kimberly Papillon, The Hard Science of Civil Rights: How Neuroscience 
Changes the Conversation, EQUAL JUST. SOC’Y, https://equaljusticesociety.org/law/
implicitbias/primer/ (last visited June 30, 2017); Nick Kim Sexton, Study Reveals Americans’ 
Subconscious Racial Biases, NBC NEWS (Aug. 21, 2015, 10:06 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
news/asian-america/new-study-exposes-racial-preferences-americans-n413371.
21. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 11, at 47.
5
Kakoyannis: Assessing the Viability of Implicit Bias Evidence in Discriminati
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
1186 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
Another developing field of research has attempted to identify the 
behavioral consequences of these biases.22 For example, one study found
that employers evaluated resumes differently based on the names of the 
applicants. Resumes with white-sounding names received 50% more 
callbacks than resumes with black-sounding names.23 Another well-
known study on “shooter bias” primed non-black participants with black 
or white faces before asking them to identify whether an object in a 
subject’s hand was a tool or a gun.24 Participants more often correctly 
identified tools in the hands of whites and guns in the hands of blacks.25
This has led some to infer that police officers, in high-pressure situations, 
are more likely to shoot a black suspect than a white suspect under 
otherwise identical circumstances.26
Scholars increasingly argue that these and related research findings 
should bear on cases involving police violence, discrimination,27 and 
school discipline.28 The cases discussed in this Comment represent 
attempts to offer the data and body of scholarship on implicit bias as 
evidence of employment discrimination.
II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS FOR IMPLICIT BIAS EVIDENCE IN 
DISCRIMINATION CASES
Common evidentiary standards and theories of employment 
discrimination provide a basis for comparing the five major implicit bias 
cases. In order to understand the comparison, it is helpful to understand 
such underlying standards and theories. This Part provides a brief 
background.
                                                                                                                     
22. Kang, supra note 10, at 1514.
23. Id. at 1516 n.122.
24. Id. at 1525.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., id. at 1527 n.194.
27. E.g., Krieger, supra note 9, at 1164 (applying cognitive bias theory to employment 
discrimination); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 2035, 2040 (2011) (“[C]ourts should reconsider their behavioral assumptions about police 
decisionmaking and judgments about criminality.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the 
Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power to Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
221, 235–36 (2003) (advocating the use of “racial auditors” to gather and disseminate information 
about police departments’ racially disparate treatment of criminal suspects).
28. E.g., Jason P. Nance, Implicit Racial Bias and Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights
(forthcoming 2017); James P. Nance, Over-Discplining Students, Racial Bias, and the School-to-
Prison Pipeline, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1063 (2016).
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A. Theories of Discrimination
In federal employment discrimination actions, plaintiffs usually 
proceed under either disparate treatment29 or disparate impact30 theories 
of discrimination.31 Disparate treatment is sometimes referred to as 
intentional discrimination, because it requires proof of discriminatory 
motive.32 Circumstantial evidence may be used to prove motive in 
disparate treatment cases.33 Disparate impact cases, in contrast, involve 
employer policies or practices that are not facially discriminatory but 
have a disproportionally adverse impact on a protected group of 
employees.34 Disparate impact theory does not require proof of motive.35
Under both theories of relief, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination; then, the burden shifts to the defendant to explain the 
alleged discriminatory effect.36
                                                                                                                     
29. There are two major categories of disparate treatment claims. One is individual 
disparate treatment claims, which allege specific instances of discriminatory conduct that 
adversely affect a single employee or applicant. 3 EMP’T DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR,
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW § 136:9, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2016). Evidence for these 
claims usually takes the form of the conduct and motivations of individual employers. Id. § 136:8. 
The other category is referred to as group or “pattern and practice” disparate treatment claims. Id. 
§ 136:9. These claims resemble disparate impact claims in that they often rely on statistical 
evidence showing an employer’s systemic discriminatory treatment of a whole group of 
employees. Id.
30. Disparate impact theory prohibits “practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in 
operation.” Id. § 136:11. Independently of employer motivation, policies and practices may act as 
“built-in headwinds” for protected groups that hinder members of those groups from succeeding 
in the workplace. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Rather than proving an 
employer acted with the intent to discriminate, plaintiffs in disparate impact cases must identify a 
particular employment practice, prove there exists a disparate impact on the protected group to
which the plaintiff belongs, and like in disparate treatment cases, prove causation. 3 EMP’T
DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR, supra note 29, § 136:11.
31. 3 EMP’T DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR, supra note 29, § 136:6.A.
32. Id.
33. To advance a disparate treatment discrimination claim, a plaintiff must prove that an 
employer’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s injury. Mixed-motive analysis is a classification of this 
causation requirement that may be invoked by plaintiffs in Title VII actions. Id. § 136:44. Under 
this analysis, a plaintiff proves causation by presenting sufficient evidence that a protected 
classification was a motivating factor in an employment action. Id. § 136:19. A discriminatory 
motive does not need to be the but-for cause of a plaintiff’s injury, as long as an unlawful motive 
was a “motivating factor.” See, e.g., Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 347 
(5th Cir. 2007). Mixed-motive causation can be advanced in Title VII cases, but not in ADA and 
ADEA actions, which require but-for causation. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 
F.3d 312, 317 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009)); 3
EMP’T DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR, supra note 29, § 136:19.
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B.  Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Standard for 
Expert Testimony
Three of the four cases discussed in this Comment turned on whether 
implicit bias scholar Dr. Anthony Greenwald satisfied Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702’s requirements for expert witnesses. Important to these 
decisions was the distinction between the elements contained in the text 
of Rule 702 and those of an alternative test described in the Advisory 
Committee Notes to the 2000 Amendment, which applies to experts 
giving generalized, rather than factually specific, testimony. The purpose 
of the former, traditional Rule 702 test is to determine the admissibility 
of experts who intend to make specific conclusions about the facts of the 
case. For example, in a discrimination case, an expert admitted under this 
standard might opine that a particular employer policy had a 
discriminatory effect. In contrast, the purpose of the test for generalized 
testimony is to determine the admissibility of experts who will not make 
specific conclusions about the facts of the case and will instead provide 
general knowledge to aid the understanding of the fact-finder.37 The 
traditional test in the text of Rule 702 permits testimony by a qualified 
expert if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is 
based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the 
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the 
facts of the case.38
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s Daubert I opinion assigns trial 
judges the responsibility of acting as “gatekeepers” permitting only 
qualified experts that satisfy the federal rule.39 Additionally, a corollary 
to the first element of Rule 702 is that expert testimony assist the trier of 
fact and relate to, or “fit,” the underlying facts of the case.40
The alternative test for testimony on “general principles” is introduced 
in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 Amendment and prescribed 
for situations where “[i]t might also be important . . . for an expert to 
educate the factfinder about general principles, without ever attempting 
                                                                                                                     
37. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
38. FED. R. EVID. 702.
39. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert I), 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
40. See id. at 591. This inquiry “demands ‘a valid scientific connection to the pertinent 
inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.’” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 
43 F.3d 1311, 1317–18, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995).
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to apply these principles to the specific facts of the case.”41 This test is 
very similar to the test in the text of Rule 702 and requires that:
(1) the expert be qualified; (2) the testimony address a 
subject matter on which the factfinder can be assisted by an 
expert; (3) the testimony be reliable; and (4) the testimony 
“fit” the facts of the case.42
The principal difference between the two tests is that the test for 
generalized testimony does not require that “the expert has reliably 
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”43 Plaintiffs 
seeking to admit implicit bias evidence in discrimination cases have more 
often than not argued that this “general principles” test applies, because 
it relieves them of the burden of concretely linking expert testimony on 
the statistical prevalence of implicit bias in the United States to its 
operation in the specific employment decisions under review.
III. FEDERAL DISCRIMINATION CASES DISCUSSING IMPLICIT BIAS
There are three federal cases that offer endorsements of implicit bias 
evidence in discrimination cases: Samaha, Kimble, and Martin. Martin is
discussed later in this Comment because that case was decided years after 
the other four cases featured here and comments on one of the cases
discussed below.
A. Samaha: Admitting Expert Testimony on Implicit Bias to Establish 
“General Principles”
In Samaha v. Washington State Department of Transportation,44 an 
Arab plaintiff who was an employee of the Washington Department of 
Transportation brought an individual discrimination claim against the 
agency under sections 1981, 1983, and 1985 of the Civil Rights Act, as 
well as under a state anti-discrimination statute, alleging disparate 
treatment on the basis of his national origin.45 The plaintiff contended that 
his employer held him to a higher standard than employees of non-Arab 
backgrounds, particularly in performance evaluations.46 Mr. Samaha 
sought to introduce the expert testimony of Dr. Anthony Greenwald,47 the 
creator of the IAT. The defendant moved in limine to exclude Dr. 
                                                                                                                     
41. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
42. Id.
43. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
44. Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Testimony, Samaha v. Wash. State 
Dep’t of Transp., No. CV-10-175-RMP, 2012 WL 11091843 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2012).
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Greenwald’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.48 District 
Judge Rosanna M. Peterson denied the motion.49
Mr. Samaha couched his description of Dr. Greenwald’s testimony in 
general terms. His witness declaration described the purpose of his 
testimony as “provid[ing] a framework that can aid a judge or jury in 
evaluating the facts of this case to better understand the evidence as it
relates to discriminatory intent.”50 Additionally, Dr. Greenwald 
summarized his research findings in a six-point outline,51 including that 
“seventy percent of Americans ‘hold implicit prejudiced views’ based on 
race, color, national origin and ethnicity” and that “job performance 
evaluations conducted by personnel using subjective criterion permit 
implicit biases to affect the outcome.”52
The court’s consideration of Dr. Greenwald’s proffered testimony was 
analyzed under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.53 The defendants’ motion 
to exclude Dr. Greenwald’s testimony charged that it was “not relevant, 
is unfairly prejudicial, and fails to ‘appl[y] the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case.’”54 However, the defendants did not 
contest Dr. Greenwald’s qualifications as an expert.55 Additionally, they 
did not challenge the validity or reliability of his research methodology 
and findings or of implicit bias theory.56 Instead, they argued that the 
results of the IAT test amounted to “statistical generalizations” that had 
not been clearly linked to the defendants’ conduct.57 Indeed, Dr. 
Greenwald did not opine about the presence of implicit bias at the 
Washington Department of Transportation, and he admitted that his 
familiarity with the facts of the case was limited to reading the plaintiff’s
complaint.58
In her analysis of Rule 702’s “reliability” factors (elements (b)–(c)),59
Judge Peterson did not consider whether Dr. Greenwald’s opinions had 
been properly applied to the facts of the case.60 The court was satisfied 
                                                                                                                     
48. Id. at *2.
49. Id. at *5.
50. Id. at *1.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at *2–3.
54. Id. at *2.
55. Id. at *3. In addition to the four elements Rule 702 requires expert to satisfy, Rule 702 
requires that a witness be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education.” FED. R. EVID. 702.
56. Samaha, 2012 WL 11091843, at *3 (“Defendants do not directly challenge the validity 
of implicit bias theory.”).
57. Id.
58. Id. at *1.
59. See supra text accompanying note 38.
60. Samaha, 2012 WL 11091843, at *3.
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that Dr. Greenwald’s research findings were corroborated by other social 
scientists in the field and “includ[ed] implicit bias relating to Arabs and 
other persons of color.”61 Therefore, Judge Peterson found that his 
opinions were “sufficiently ‘ground[ed] in the methods and procedures 
of science.’”62
Under the “helpfulness and fit” requirements of Rule 702 (element 
(a)),63 the court examined the defendants’ contention that Dr. 
Greenwald’s testimony had not been connected to specific conduct in the 
case64 but concluded that the alternative test for generalized testimony 
applied. Under this analysis, Dr. Greenwald’s testimony did not have to 
be applied to the facts of the case, and the defendants had effectively 
conceded parts (1) and (3) of the test65 by admitting, respectively, that Dr. 
Greenwald was qualified and that his research methodology was reliable.
Without extensive discussion, Judge Peterson concluded that the other 
elements of the test were also satisfied, because “Dr. Greenwald’s
testimony is likely to provide the jury with information that it will be able 
to use to draw its own conclusions.”66 Therefore, the court held that the 
testimony was “helpful enough to survive the admissibility threshold”
and denied the defendants’ motion to exclude it.67
B.  Kimble: Affirming the Relevance of Implicit Bias as Circumstantial 
Evidence in Discrimination Cases
The other federal decision treating implicit bias evidence favorably is 
the Eastern District of Wisconsin’s Kimble v. Wisconsin Department of 
Workforce Development.68 In Kimble, a black male supervisor employed 
by the Equal Rights Division of the Wisconsin Department of Workforce 
Development sued his employer and an individual administrator under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for intentional discrimination.69
Specifically, Mr. Kimble argued that the defendants had discriminated 
against him on the basis of a combination of race and gender by not giving 
him a raise.70 Unlike in Samaha and the other two cases discussed in this 
Comment, infra, Mr. Kimble did not present an expert on implicit bias.
Therefore, the court did not undertake a Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
                                                                                                                     
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting Daubert I, 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993)).
63. See supra text accompanying note 38.
64. Samaha, 2012 WL 11091843, at *3–4.
65. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
66. Samaha, 2012 WL 11091843, at *4.
67. Id.
68. 690 F. Supp. 2d 765 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
69. Id. at 767.
70. Id. 
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analysis. Mr. Kimble’s case went to a bench trial,71 and implicit bias 
factored into Judge Lynn Adelman’s examination of the circumstantial 
evidence of discrimination. Considering the plaintiff’s case and the 
defendants’ explanation for the alleged disparate treatment, the court 
found the defendants had violated Title VII.72
After rejecting the defendants’ explanation for their allegedly 
discriminatory conduct, Judge Adelman wrote at length about “additional 
evidence” supporting her decision, “[even though the court’s] rejection 
of defendants’ explanation is a sufficient basis for finding liability.”73
Judge Adelman characterized this section as an “explanation” of her 
findings,74 in which she made reference to a collection of implicit bias 
scholars, including Dr. Anthony Greenwald.75 Additionally, Judge 
Adelman reviewed parts of the record—particularly, the testimony of the 
plaintiff’s supervisor—and found that “[w]hile the supervisor may have 
intentionally discriminated against the Salvadoran, he might also have 
treated him poorly because he viewed him through the lens of an 
uncomplimentary stereotype.”76
Furthermore, the court noted other circumstances that gave rise to the 
possibility that implicit bias caused discrimination: most notably, “when 
the evaluation of employees is highly subjective, there is a risk that 
supervisors will make judgments based on stereotypes of which they may 
or may not be entirely aware.”77 This combination of factors led Judge 
Adelman to conclude that, “in addition to failing to provide a credible 
explanation of the conduct complained of, [the defendant supervisor] 
behaved in a manner suggesting the presence of implicit bias.”78
Interestingly, this reference to implicit bias was of the court’s own 
initiative and was not mentioned in any of the pleadings.
The Samaha and Kimble cases, taken together, offer plaintiffs in 
discrimination cases room to argue that evidence of implicit bias is 
admissible and can bolster circumstantial evidence of discriminatory 
                                                                                                                     
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 775. Judge Adelman described the standard of review in individual Title VII 
disparate treatment cases as requiring “only [a determination] that the employer made the 
challenged decision based on a protected trait.” Id. at 768. Furthermore, Judge Adelman qualified 
that “a trier of fact [need not] decide whether a decision-maker acted purposively or based on 
stereotypical attitudes of which he or she was partially or entirely unaware.” Id. “As in most Title 
VII cases,” Mr. Kimble relied on circumstantial evidence to prove discrimination. Id. at 769. 
73. Id. at 775–78.
74. Id. at 775.
75. Id. at 776 (citing Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 11).
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 775–76 (citing United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 515 (7th Cir. 2005);
Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004)).
78. Id. at 778.
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intent. However, two other district court cases, Jones and Karlo, firmly 
rejected implicit bias evidence on several grounds.
C.  Jones I: Rejecting Expert Testimony on Implicit Bias as a Way of 
Establishing “General Principles”
Jones v. National Council of Young Men’s Christian Associations of
the United States79 was a class action brought by black employees of the 
YMCA against their employer alleging unintentional discrimination and 
disparate impact under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 
1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and state discrimination statutes.80
The employees challenged the YMCA’s practices with regard to 
performance evaluations, compensation, promotion, and job 
assignment.81 The issue during the stage of the case that concerns this 
Comment was class certification of the plaintiffs’ Title VII claims.82 The 
plaintiffs sought to introduce the expert testimony of Dr. Anthony 
Greenwald, and the YMCA moved to strike the testimony.83 The motion 
was considered both by a magistrate judge84 and a district judge85 in the 
Northern District of Illinois. Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys 
recommended that the district court grant the defendants’ motion to 
strike, and his recommendation was adopted in its entirety.86
In Jones I, like in Samaha, Dr. Greenwald’s witness declaration spoke 
generally of his research and findings.87 The plaintiffs asserted that the 
court should rule under the Advisory Committee’s standard for 
generalized testimony.88 Like in Samaha, Dr. Greenwald was familiar 
with employment at the YMCA only from reading materials given to him 
by the plaintiffs.89 The Jones defendants, however, made several strategic 
choices that the Samaha defendants had not. First, they disputed the 
                                                                                                                     
79. Jones v. Nat’l Council of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns of the United States (Jones II),
34 F. Supp. 3d 896 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
80. Id. at 897–98. 
81. Jones v. Nat’l Council of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns of the United States (Jones I), 
No. 09-C-6437, 2013 WL 7046374, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2013).
82. See id.
83. Id. at *4–5.
84. Id. at *1.
85. Jones II, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 897.
86. Jones I, 2013 WL 7046374, at *1; Jones II, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 898. However, District 
Judge John J. Tharp, Jr. wrote separately and at length to detail his rejection of the testimony. 
Jones II, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 898–901. In this Comment, the magistrate judge’s opinion is referred 
to as “Jones I” and the district judge’s opinion is referred to as “Jones II.”
87. Jones I, 2013 WL 7046374, at *6.
88. Id. at *7.
89. Id. at *6.
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helpfulness of Dr. Greenwald’s testimony.90 The second element of the 
Advisory Committee test for generalized testimony requires that an 
expert “address a subject matter on which the factfinder can be assisted 
by an expert.”91 The Jones defendants argued that discrimination was 
within an ordinary juror’s understanding and not appropriately the subject 
of expert testimony on “general principles.”92 Magistrate Judge Keys, 
however, rejected this characterization of Dr. Greenwald’s research and 
would “not rule out the possibility of a need for a factfinder to be educated 
on implicit bias.”93
The Jones defendants also challenged Dr. Greenwald’s 
methodology,94 which the Samaha defendants had conceded.95 They 
argued that the plaintiffs could not satisfy Rule 702’s reliability prong 
without presenting evidence that Dr. Greenwald’s laboratory testing 
“applies to employment decision-making.”96 Furthermore, the Jones 
defendants brought in their own expert, Dr. Philip Tetlock, to support 
their contention that Dr. Greenwald’s research findings were “far 
removed from workplace realities” and did not account for “debiasing 
conditions and factors” potentially present at the YMCA.97 The 
magistrate judge found this rebuttal persuasive in light of the fact that Dr. 
Greenwald admittedly had not conducted IAT tests specific to 
employment decisions and had not investigated potential variables at the 
YMCA.98 Accordingly, the court recommended that the defendants’ 
motion to strike be granted because the plaintiffs’ proffered testimony 
had not satisfied the reliability element of the test for generalized 
testimony.99
D.  Jones II: Doubting Whether the Test for Generalized Testimony 
Applies to Experts on Implicit Bias
The district court adopted Magistrate Judge Keys’s report and 
recommendation in full.100 However, District Judge Tharp went further 
than the report and recommendation in his rejection of Dr. Greenwald’s 
testimony. The district court not only found that Dr. Greenwald’s 
testimony failed the general principles test on multiple grounds; it also 
                                                                                                                     
90. Id. at *7.
91. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
92. Jones I, 2013 WL 7046374, at *7.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *8.
95. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
96. Jones I, 2013 WL 7046374, at *8.
97. Id.
98. Id. 
99. Id. at *9.
100. Jones II, 34 F. Supp. 3d 896, 898 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
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questioned whether his testimony was truly being offered to elucidate 
general principles.101
“Even at the level of general principles,” Judge Tharp was not 
satisfied that Dr. Greenwald’s testimony would “fit” the case closely 
enough to aid the jury, which is the fourth requirement of the Advisory 
Committee test.102 Combining the adopted report and recommendation 
with Judge Tharp’s separate opinion, the plaintiffs were defeated on two 
elements of the test—reliability and fit. Despite holding under a different 
element of the general principles test, Judge Tharp’s reasoning was very 
similar to Judge Keys’s. He found Dr. Greenwald’s research on implicit 
bias did not fit the case because it was “derived solely from laboratory 
testing that does not remotely approximate the conditions that apply in 
this case.”103
Furthermore, the district court questioned whether Dr. Greenwald’s 
opinions even qualified as generalized testimony.104 Specifically, Judge 
Tharp suspected that the general principles on which Dr. Greenwald was 
to educate the jury were effectively conclusory statements on 
causation.105 One particular phrase in Dr. Greenwald’s report troubled the 
court: his conclusion that “it is more likely than not that adverse impact 
is a consequence of unintended discrimination, which can be brought 
about by managers.”106 Judge Tharp saw this as a finding specific to the 
facts of the case, not a general principle, and thus argued that the plaintiffs 
should have to justify it under the text of Rule 702, not the test for 
generalized testimony.107 This was a critical blow to the plaintiffs, who 
“[did] not attempt to defend the admissibility of [Dr. Greenwald’s] 
opinions on the basis that he has applied the general principles of his 
implicit bias theory to the facts of this case.”108
E.  Karlo: Fundamentally Questioning the Relevance of Implicit Bias 
Evidence in Discrimination Cases
The Western District of Pennsylvania’s decision in Karlo v. 
Pittsburgh Glass Works109 represents the most negative treatment of both 
Dr. Anthony Greenwald’s testimony and implicit bias theory generally. 
                                                                                                                     
101. See id. at 899–901.
102. Id. at 900.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 899–901.
106. Id. at 899.
107. Id. at 900.
108. Id.
109. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC (Karlo II), No. 2:10-cv-1283, 2015 WL 4232600 
(W.D. Pa. July 13, 2015), vacated, 849 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2017).
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The court not only expressly followed the Jones court and rejected 
Samaha, it also criticized Dr. Greenwald’s methodology and the validity 
of implicit bias research and scholarship.110
In Karlo, former employees of Pittsburgh Glass Works (PGW) 
brought an action against the company under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, alleging that the defendant’s lay-off practices 
illegally discriminated on the basis of age.111 The case, at the stages 
relevant to this Comment, was comprised of the individual disparate 
impact and disparate treatment claims of several plaintiffs.112 The 
plaintiffs sought to introduce several experts, including Dr. Anthony 
Greenwald.113 After conducting an analysis under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702,114 the court granted the defendant’s motion to exclude Dr. 
Greenwald’s testimony.115 Like in Jones and Samaha, Dr. Greenwald’s 
witness declaration stated that his testimony would “provide a framework 
that can aid a judge or jury in evaluating the facts” and thus sought to 
introduce Dr. Greenwald as an expert on general principles.116
However, the Karlo plaintiffs also used tactics in their effort to enter 
Dr. Greenwald’s testimony that the Jones plaintiffs had not. For one, they 
charged violations under both disparate impact and disparate treatment 
theories.117 Additionally, Dr. Greenwald seemed to be more acquainted 
with the facts and specific employment conditions at PGW than he had 
been with conditions at the YMCA. For example, in addition to reading 
the plaintiffs’ complaint, he examined the depositions of several key 
defense witnesses and concluded there are a number of “research findings 
regarding implicit bias [that] bear on this case.”118 PGW responded by 
questioning not only Dr. Greenwald’s application of his expertise to the 
facts of the case, but also his qualifications as an expert under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404.119 This was a step further than the defendants in 
Samaha and Jones had gone.120
Judge Terrence F. McVerry found the plaintiffs’ argument 
unconvincing on all fronts. Noting his disagreement with Samaha, he 
wrote: “Dr. Greenwald’s opinion is not based on sufficient facts or data. 
                                                                                                                     
110. See Karlo II, 2015 WL 4232600, at *1.
111. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC (Karlo I), No. 2:10-cv-1283, 2014 WL 1317595, 
at *9–10 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014).
112. Id. at *10.
113. Karlo II, 2015 WL 4232600, at *1.
114. FED. R. EVID. 702.
115. Karlo II, 2015 WL 4232600, at *9.
116. Id. at *8.
117. Karlo I, 2014 WL 1317595, at *10.
118. Karlo II, 2015 WL 4232600, at *7.
119. Id. at *5; FED. R. EVID. 404.
120. See supra notes 44–66, 79–105 and accompanying text.
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It is not the product of reliable methods. And it would not assist the 
factfinder . . . .”121 These three findings correspond to three of the four 
elements of Rule 702.122 Interestingly, the court did not directly address 
the alternative test for generalized testimony found in the Advisory 
Committee Notes, even though it acknowledged that both the Samaha 
and Jones courts relied on that test.123 However, Judge McVerry agreed 
with the district court’s opinion in Jones that Dr. Greenwald’s testimony 
was effectively being offered to prove causation.124 Judge McVerry’s 
agreement on this point suggests that he, like District Judge Tharp in 
Jones II, did not consider the Advisory Committee test applicable.
Even if the Karlo court had applied the general principles test, the 
plaintiffs would likely have failed to satisfy it because the court was 
deeply skeptical about implicit bias scholarship. Judge McVerry 
characterized Dr. Greenwald’s attempt to apply his research to the facts 
of the case as a “superficial analysis” based on “the say-so of an 
academic.”125 He went further to criticize the IAT as a tool of 
measurement, saying Dr. Greenwald “cannot establish that his publicly 
available test was taken by a representative sample of the population” and 
that he “fails to show that the data is not skewed by those who self-select 
to participate.”126 The court also observed that Dr. Greenwald had not 
visited PGW or conducted specific research on the employment 
environment.127 That criticism is closely aligned with both the magistrate 
and district judge opinions in Jones.128
Finally, the Karlo court doubted that evidence of implicit bias would 
be relevant to a discrimination claim even if an expert satisfied Rule 
702.129 Judge McVerry argued that the plaintiff’s discriminatory 
treatment theory, which requires proof of motive, “seems incompatible 
with a theory in which bias may play an unconscious role in decision-
making.”130 Furthermore, “[i]n a disparate impact claim, evidence of 
implicit bias makes even less sense, particularly because a plaintiff need 
not show motive.”131 This assessment questions whether implicit bias 
evidence would ever be admissible, even if not in the form of expert 
testimony.
                                                                                                                     
121. Karlo II, 2015 WL 4232600, at *7.
122. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
123. Karlo II, 2015 WL 4232600, at *7.
124. See id. at *8.
125. Id. at *7.
126. Id. at *8.
127. Id. at *7.
128. See supra notes 92–105 and accompanying text.
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As damaging as the district court’s opinion in Karlo is, its sharpest 
criticisms were blunted on appeal. The Third Circuit affirmed the
exclusion of Dr. Greenwald and agreed with the district court’s 
“observ[ation] that disparate-impact claims do not inquire into the 
employer’s state of mind” and that “population-wide statistics have only 
speculative application to [the defendant].”132 However, the court 
qualified, “[t]hat is not to say . . . that implicit-bias testimony is never 
admissible.”133 The portion of the (lengthy) opinion dedicated to Dr. 
Greenwald is only two paragraphs long, and the court did not elaborate 
further.134
F.  Martin: An Expansion of Implicit Bias in Disparate Treatment 
Cases, but with Limitations
The most recent federal discrimination case in which implicit bias was 
discussed expanded the ways in which expert testimony can potentially 
be offered, but it also limited the scope of this expansion. In Martin v. 
F.E. Moran, Inc.,135 the Northern District of Illinois took up the question 
again, over two years after deciding Jones II.136 The plaintiffs in Martin
brought federal racial discrimination claims against their former 
employer.137 They alleged that disparate treatment of African-American 
and other minority employees resulted in fewer opportunities and a 
disproportionate number of terminations.138 The plaintiffs proffered two 
experts in support of their claims.139 One, Destiny Peery, sought to 
“present sociological evidence that pervasive discriminatory attitudes in 
the workplace can lead to adverse employment actions,”140 “describe the 
context in which [the defendant] made employment decisions,”141 and 
testify as to possible implicit and explicit biases in the defendant’s 
workplace.142 District Judge Virginia M. Kendall held Peery’s testimony 
was admissible, denying the defendant’s motion to exclude her reports 
and bar her testimony.143
                                                                                                                     
132. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 84–85 (3d Cir. 2017).
133. Id. at 85.
134. See id.
135. 2017 WL 1105388 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2017).
136. See id.




141. Id. at *2.
142. Id.
143. Id. at *5.
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Like in the other cases discussed supra, the court evaluated Dr. 
Peery’s proffered testimony under Rule 702.144 However, unlike in those 
cases, neither the plaintiffs nor the court invoked the “general principles” 
test. Rather, the court applied traditional Rule 702, meaning the plaintiffs 
had to establish that Dr. Peery “reliably appl[ied] [her] principles and 
methods to the facts of the case.”145 The defendant challenged both Dr. 
Peery’s qualifications and the reliability of her testimony.146 The court 
quickly rejected the challenge to Dr. Peery’s qualifications but analyzed 
the reliability of her opinions extensively.147 Unlike experts in favorable 
cases Samaha and Kimble, Dr. Peery “support[ed] her conclusions in both 
the record of the case and external research.”148 Specifically, she 
reviewed “emails and deposition testimony produced by [the 
defendant].”149 However, Dr. Peery did not conduct implicit bias tests at 
the plaintiffs’ workplace or on specific supervisors.150 Predictably, the 
defendant challenged her application of implicit bias research to the facts 
of the case, arguing her report “lack[ed] [a] scientific basis and [a] 
testable methodology.”151
The defendant’s argument was misplaced, “because Peery [was] not 
purporting to conduct a traditional scientific assessment, but rather [was] 
basing her opinion on general psychological principles and her 
experience in the field.”152 Nevertheless, the defendant pressed that Dr. 
Peery’s opinions were still unsupported.153 For this argument, the 
defendant cited Jones II.154 The court briefly distinguished the case, 
saying “[h]ere, Peery’s opinions are rooted in the facts in the record, and 
her opinions are not as conclusory as the expert’s in Jones.”155
However, the court carefully limited its holding on this and other 
issues, principally by observing repeatedly that Martin was a bench trial, 
and therefore “the Court . . . need not perform the same gatekeeping role 
of keeping unreliable expert testimony from the jury.”156 “If the issue 
                                                                                                                     
144. See id. at *1, *3.
145. Id. at *1 (citation omitted).
146. Id. at *2.
147. See id. at *3–5.
148. Id. at *3.
149. Id. at *2.
150. Id.
151. Id. at *3.
152. Id.
153. See id. at *3–4.
154. Id. at *4 (citing Jones II, 34 F. Supp. 3d 896, 899–900 (N.D. Ill. 2014)). 
155. Martin, 2017 WL 1105388, at *4. 
156. Id.
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were before a jury,” certain distinctions parsed by the court that salvaged 
Dr. Peery’s testimony “might be lost.”157
Despite this important limitation, Martin still marks a success for 
plaintiffs offering expert testimony on implicit bias in federal 
discrimination cases. The plaintiffs made relatively minor adjustments to 
how their expert’s testimony was characterized compared to the experts 
in Jones and Karlo. Furthermore, it is difficult to argue that Dr. Peery 
more extensively applied implicit bias research to the facts of the case 
than the expert in Karlo,158 yet the Martin court admitted her testimony. 
Although the importance of Martin being a bench trial remains to be seen, 
the case stands firmly in support of expert testimony on implicit bias.
IV. ASSESSING THE VIABILITY OF IMPLICIT BIAS EVIDENCE IN 
DISCRIMINATION CASES GOING FORWARD
Part III analyzed the five federal cases that have extensively discussed 
implicit bias: Samaha, Kimble, Jones, Karlo, and Martin. Because there 
are only these five cases, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions. The 
plaintiffs in each case were differently situated, and the defendants made 
different strategic choices. Nevertheless, this Part considers ways in 
which implicit bias evidence could be presented to increase the likelihood 
it will be admitted and to minimize conflict with the unfavorable 
precedent. It also looks at strategies for admitting implicit bias evidence 
that have not yet been attempted but are potentially promising.
A. Implicit Bias Evidence Is More Viable if Offered As Proof of 
Intentional Discrimination
A comparison of the five cases discussed in this Comment indicates 
that implicit bias evidence is more likely to be admitted if offered to prove 
intentional discrimination. One glaring reason for this is that none of the 
plaintiffs who have attempted to use implicit bias evidence to support 
disparate impact claims have succeeded. In the three cases that treated 
implicit bias evidence favorably, Samaha, Kimble, and Martin, the 
plaintiffs advanced disparate treatment claims.159 In the Jones cases, the 
plaintiffs proffered testimony on implicit bias to support a disparate 
impact theory and were unsuccessful.160 In Karlo, the plaintiffs’ attempt 
to admit his testimony under both theories was rejected, but the court was 
especially critical in the disparate impact context, saying “[i]n a disparate 
impact claim, evidence of implicit bias makes even less sense, 
                                                                                                                     
157. Id.
158. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 46, 70, 138 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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particularly because a plaintiff need not show motive.”161 Furthermore, 
the appellate court, in affirming the lower court, did not mention the 
plaintiffs’ disparate treatment theory at all.162
A more nuanced reason why implicit bias evidence is more likely to 
be admitted in support of disparate treatment claims is the need for 
plaintiffs to avoid the appearance that they are offering the evidence as 
proof of causation. Because generalized testimony cannot encompass 
conclusions specific to the facts of the case, and whether employer 
conduct caused discrimination is a conclusion specific to the facts of the 
case, experts most likely cannot assert that implicit bias caused 
discrimination in a specific workplace.163 However, generalized 
testimony can comment on the nature and operation of motive—for 
example, by explaining that it is often influenced by unconscious 
biases.164 In both Jones and Karlo, the defendants successfully argued 
that Dr. Anthony Greenwald’s testimony was effectively being offered to 
prove causation—not, as the plaintiffs claimed, for the purpose of 
establishing general principles underlying discrimination.165 In contrast, 
the court in Martin stressed that “Peery opines on the presence of 
stereotypes and aversive racism at FPN and how that could have 
influenced decision makers.”166
This “causation trap” is more likely to ensnare plaintiffs arguing 
disparate impact. When there is no need to prove motive, it is difficult for 
plaintiffs to explain the purpose, if not causation, for which implicit bias 
evidence should be admitted. This difficulty was seized upon by the 
district court in Jones II, which wrote “the lack of ‘fit’ . . . is evidenced 
by the plaintiffs’ inability to identify a purpose for admitting his
testimony.”167 In contrast, plaintiffs arguing disparate treatment can more 
easily assert that implicit bias evidence is useful for explaining motive 
without “cross[ing] into the realm of causation.”168 Indeed, expert 
testimony was successfully framed in Samaha as a means of 
“understand[ing] the evidence as it related to discriminatory intent.”169
                                                                                                                     
161. Karlo II, No. 2:10-cv-1283, 2015 WL 4232600, at *9 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2015). 
162. See Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 84–85 (3d Cir. 2017).
163. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 104–05, 124 and accompanying text.
166. Martin v. F.E. Moran, Inc., No. 13-C-03526, 2017 WL 1105388, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
24, 2017).
167. Jones II, 34 F. Supp. 3d 896, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2014). The court also noted that Dr. 
Greenwald’s testimony would be unavailing to a disparate treatment claim, but such a claim was 
not before the court. Id.
168. Id.
169. Samaha v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., No. CV-10-175-RMP, 2012 WL 11091843, 
at *1 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2012).
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1.  Group Claims May Be More Likely to Succeed Than 
Individual Claims
Group disparate treatment claims advancing a pattern or practice 
theory of motive may offer a promising avenue for plaintiffs going 
forward, although it has not yet been attempted. Pattern or practice claims 
rely on statistical evidence gleaned from a bird’s-eye view of 
employment decisions.170 This type of evidence paints the collective acts 
of an employer’s agents as indicative of the employer’s motivations.171
Structurally, this theory of motive resembles implicit bias theory, which 
represents that biases operating pervasively but imperceptibly can 
culminate in discriminatory practices. Accordingly, courts may be less 
willing to declare that implicit bias evidence does not “fit” a case if the 
evidence is offered alongside other structurally and conceptually similar 
evidence. Furthermore, defendants challenging implicit bias evidence are 
likely to argue that it represents only “statistical generalizations,”172 but 
that argument will carry less force if plaintiffs employ a theory of motive 
that relies heavily on statistical evidence.
Additionally, advancing a pattern or practice theory of motive might 
relieve plaintiffs, and experts like Dr. Greenwald, of identifying specific 
actions that, by themselves, evince a discriminatory motive. Indeed, in 
Samaha, the defendants argued (and the plaintiffs conceded) that Dr. 
Greenwald’s testimony did not attempt to ascertain “whether implicit bias 
played any role in any employment decision.”173 The Samaha court was 
not troubled by Dr. Greenwald’s generalized assertions, but the Jones and 
Karlo court saw this lack of specificity as a critical shortcoming.174
Therefore, framing motive in terms of a pattern or practice embodied in 
multiple, diverse acts may be a productive strategy for assuaging the 
doubts of courts taking the latter approach.
2.  Title VII Disparate Treatment Claimants Are in the Best Position to 
Use Implicit Bias Evidence
Although disparate treatment is a theory of discrimination available 
under most discrimination statutes, a “mixed-motive” theory of causation 
is permitted only by Title VII.175 This gives Title VII plaintiffs a way to 
escape the “causation trap” discussed in the previous Subsection, 
whereby a defendant alleges that a plaintiff’s expert is being improperly 
                                                                                                                     
170. See supra note 29.
171. See supra note 29.
172. See, e.g., Samaha, 2012 WL 11091843, at *3.
173. Id.
174. See supra notes 60, 65, 99–100, 121 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 33.
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offered to prove causation rather than abstract general principles. The 
mixed-motive theory allows a plaintiff to prove causation by presenting 
sufficient evidence that a protected classification was a “motivating 
factor” in an employment decision, but not necessarily a but-for cause.176
Therefore, a mixed-motive analysis arguably allows plaintiffs to present 
this evidence as proof of causation. Tellingly, in the only Title VII case 
discussed in this Comment, Kimble, the court found that implicit bias was 
a “motivating factor” in the employer’s conduct.
B.  Expert Testimony on “General Principles” Should Be 
Presented Cautiously
For other plaintiffs not proceeding under Title VII, for whom a mixed 
motive theory of causation is not available, arguments with regard to 
implicit bias must be more carefully crafted to avoid blurring the line 
between motive and causation. Some plaintiffs have therefore chosen to 
offer expert testimony on implicit bias under the test for generalized 
testimony found in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 
Amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, rather than the textual Rule 
702 test. However, this strategy has encountered difficulties; namely, the 
causation trap discussed above, in addition to several courts’ concerns 
that Dr. Greenwald’s testimony is too abstract to be relevant. 
In Jones I, Magistrate Judge Keys stressed the extent to which Dr. 
Greenwald was unfamiliar with the specific employment conditions at 
the YMCA. Judge Keys noted that “[Dr. Greenwald] did not visit the Y’s 
offices, speak with a current or former employee of the Y . . . did not have 
IAT data for any Y manager . . . [did] not even recall seeing the Y’s equal 
employment opportunity policy or its diversity policy.”177 Furthermore, 
Judge Keys saw Dr. Greenwald’s declaration as too far removed from 
“workplace realities,”178 saying “only one paragraph in his report 
discusses the Y, and that paragraph came from his review of Plaintiffs’ 
statistical expert.”179 This language was quoted by Judge McVerry in 
Karlo180 to express that Dr. Greenwald’s opinion represented a 
“superficial analysis . . . [based on] the say-so of an academic who 
assumes that his general conclusions from the IAT would also apply to 
[the defendant].”181
Plaintiffs are unlikely to produce a controlled experiment in a 
particular workplace. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
                                                                                                                     
176. See supra note 33.
177. Jones I, No. 09-C-6437, 2013 WL 7046374, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2013).
178. Id. at *8.
179. Id. at *6.
180. Karlo II, No. 2:10-cv-1283, 2015 WL 4232600, at *6 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2015). 
181. Id. at *7.
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administer the IAT to current and former employees in a discrimination
case. Even if a plaintiff attempted to do so, it is hard to see how IAT test 
results could be used to illustrate causation. The IAT identifies the 
existence of bias, but it is not capable of measuring the extent to which 
bias played a role in a particular decision that was made in the past.182
Therefore, although offering expert testimony on implicit bias for its 
general principles rather than under the regular Rule 702 test is a viable 
strategy for discrimination claimants, plaintiffs pursuing this strategy 
must be aware of the potentially narrow window between testimony that 
is too general to bear on a specific case or, on the other hand, too specific 
to be credibly described as generalized testimony. Furthermore, the 
success of the plaintiffs in Martin under the traditional Rule 702 test 
illustrates that the general-principles test is not the only one implicit bias 
experts can satisfy.
CONCLUSION
The themes and cases discussed in this Comment represent only the 
beginning of how implicit bias evidence could be utilized in future 
litigation. Parts of the five federal cases discussed present significant 
challenges, but plaintiffs in discrimination suits can and should press on. 
Additionally, it is likely that the legal role of implicit bias will expand to 
other contexts and causes of action as scholarship and precedent continue 
to develop.
                                                                                                                     
182. See supra Part I.
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